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ARE COURTS REIAXING?
ARE COURTS RELAXING?
That precedent is of lessening value in the practice of law
is recognized only too well by most practitioners. One would
hardly be safe in advising a client that the last ruling is
squarely in his favor and that he is sure to win his case.
What is an established rule of law today may be overturned
tomorrow as is instanced by several recent decisions. There
is an inclination on the part of appellate courts to heed the
popular outcry for so-called progressiveness and to judge in-
dividual cases on what seems to be the merits, and should
such run against the snag of a fixed rule, an exception may
be found or else the rule abrogated without waiting for legis-
lative action. Case law is of an uncertain quality. It may be
that the law is passing through a stage of evolution and that
we are developing new rules and new maxims which will bet-
ter fit modern business and modern needs, but if that is so,
the lawyers who are practicing through the transition stage
are the ones who suffer. It must be exceedingly embarrass-
ing to brief a case, and to cite authorities squarely sustaining
a proposition and to have the appellate court agree that such
waq the law, and then state that time has come to change it,
and do it, and reverse the case in the face of all preceding
authorities.
A striking illustration of this is the case of Claxton v.
Pool'. That was an action by Mrs. Claxton against Mrs. Pool
and her husband for the alienation of the affections of Mr.
Pool. Follo-wing a well-grounded rule of law, that the hus-
band was liable for the torts of his wife, the husband was
joined as a party defendant. This was done upon the author-
ity of Taylor v. Pullen2. The latter was an action against hus-
band and wife for slanderous words spoken by the wife. It
1. 197 S. W. 349 (Mo. Sp. Ct).
2. 152 Mo. 434.
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was contended, on the part of the husband that since the pas-
sage of the Married Woman's Act 3, the husband was no longer
responsible for the torts of his wife and should not have been
joined. The Supreme Court held that this act did not touch
the issue nor absolve the husband. It recognized the rule as
existing and said:
"If recent statutes have so changed the rule of the com-
mon law touching the interest of the husband in the property
of the wife that there seems to be a hardship in holding him
responsible for her torts, the legislature can readily furnish
the exemption."
That decision was rendered in 1899. Note that the Court
refused to legislate, or itself to change a rule of law.
Such was the state of the law when the Claxton case went
up on appeal. It first made its appearance in the Springfield
Court of Appeals in 19144. Up to that time the Legislature
had not acted upon the suggestion of the Supreme Court. But
there was a novelty in this Claxton case. It seemed that Mrs.
Pool was charged with having had illicit relations with Mr.
Claxton and it did not seem fair to the Court of Appeals to
hold Mr. Pool liable for this kind of a tort of his wife, which
was as much a wrong to him as to Mrs. Claxton. This was the
view taken by that Court and stated in so many words. It
confessed that it could find no precedent for the decision. It
stated what was the rule of law and cited the case of Ta~jlor v.
Pullen, supra, but held that this ought to be an exception.
This decision was a pure piece of legislation on the part
of the Court. The reasoning, of course, appeals to the aver-
age man, but was it not for the Legislature to remedy the evil
instead of the Court?
The decision further criticized the rule itself and expressed
the thought that an act of the Legislature abrogating it, would
3. Secs. 6864, 6868, 6869, R. S. Mo. 1899; Secs. 7323, 7327, 7328, R. S. Mo.
1919.
4. 182 Mo. App. 13.
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be welcomed. Evidently some senator or representative
thought so, too, and in 1915 an act was passed5 which does
relieve the husband of responsibility for the torts of his wife.
However, one of the Judges of the Court of Appeals held
that the majority opinion was in conflict with the Taylor v.
Pullen case and others, and refused to accede to grafting an
exception on the rule and ordered the case certified to the
Supreme Court, and now the second stage was reached.
Bear in mind that the action arose, was tried and decided
by the Court of Appeals, before the act of 1915 was passed,
hence that had no application to the case at bar. When it
reached the Supreme Court the same questions were pre-
sented. But the latter Court, ignoring the exception grafted
on the rule by the Court of Appeals, simply tore up the whole
rule by the roots and referred to the act of 1915 as having an.
influence and bearing on the question. In a lengthy opinion it
reviews many decisions and refers to the Taylor v. Pullen
case and then abrogated the rule and refused to follow the
prior cases. Of course, this decision would have rendered the
act of 1915 unnecessary, for the Court did precisely what the
Legislature did-legislated. In doing this the Court said:
"The Legislature of 19156, possibly with a view of settling
the doubts which seem to have harassed the judicial mind, en-
acted a statute which would relieve the husband from liability
for injuries committed by a married woman, except in cases
where he would be jointly responsible if the marriage did not
exist. This, of course, simplifies the matter as to all cases
arising in the future. The present case, however, arose before
the enactment. We cannot presume from the enactment of the
statute that the law was required to be changed, because stat-
utes are often passed which simply declare a rule of law al-
ready existing. We are of the opinion that, according to the
spirit, purpose and general scope of recent legislation, in addi-
5. Session Acts, 1915, p. 269.
6. Session Acts, 1915, p. 269.
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tion to specific statutory provisions, as well as freedom of
conduct accorded to married women of later years, all indi-
cating a complete absence of the reason which supported the
old rule relating to a husband's common law liability for his
wife's torts, the rule should no longer be recognized as in
existence. ' "
Query: When did the rule cease to exist? It was iaexieP
ence in 18997. The Claxton case was decided in 1914 in the
Court of Appeals and that Court recognized it. The Legis-
lature repealed it in 1915 and the Supreme Court repealed it
in 1917. Is there, then, any stability in precedent?
In Mississippi, the Supreme Court of that State abrogated
the centuries old rule that the payment of a lesser sum will not
discharge an obligation for a greater, even if accepted as
such, for the reason that there is no consideration for the dis-
charge of the difference. In an opinion, which is full of al-
most intemperate language, that Court, while recognizing that
the rule of law has been in force for over 300 years, overrules
three former Mississippi cases and abolishes it8. Following
are quotations:
"And in the United States, blindly following what was sup-
posed to be settled law in England for nearly 300 years our
courts have uniformly announced adherence to this rule. * * *
"Turning now to the holdings of the American courts on
this question, we are profoundly and painfully impressed with
the slavish adherence of the legal and judicial mind to prece-
dent, or in many cases, to what seems to be precedent only."
If the doctrine there announced be the correct one then it
would seem to be idle work to brief cases at all and that the
proper course would be to present simply the record and facts
to an appellate court for its determination according to the
7. Taylor v. Pullen, 152 Mo. 434.
8. Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499.
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temperament of the judges who happen to be upon the bench
at the time.
Another instance of the uncertainty of the law in our own
State is the variant views concerning the amount of damage
recoverable for wrongful death occasioned by a public carrier.
Jnder our statute the amount recoverable is "not less than
two thousand and not exceeding ten thousand dollars in the
discretion of the jury."'
In the Second Boyd Case,"0 this statute was interpreted as
meaning that two thousand dollars was a penalty and the
amount between that and ten thousand dollars was compensa-
tory. This case was followed by those of Johnson v. R. R.,"
State ex rel. v. Ellison'2 and Cooley v. Durham,3 in all of
which such interpretation was stated in clear and unmistaka-
ble English.
Then came the case of Grier v. K. C. Ry. Co.," in which
the four above named were overruled and a new interpreta-
tion placed upon the statute and this was that the entire sum
is penal, that the jury might, in its discretion, assess as a pen-
alty any sum from two to ten thousand dollars. That is plain
English, too. Perhaps many members of the bar will agree
that the latter interpretation is correct and that there was
really no rational basis for the distinction made in the Second
Boyd case and those following it.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, in two cases 11 has fol-
lowed the Grier case and, in equally plain English, held the
entire sum penal.
Now comes the rub. In McDaniel v. Hines, D. G.,' 6 de-
cided March 14, 1922, the Director General of Railroads was
9. Sec. 4217, R. S. Mo. 1919.
10. 249 Mo. 110.
11. 270 Mo. 418.
12. 278 Mo. 549.
13. 196 Mo. App. 399.
14. 286 Mo. 523.
15. Miller v. K. C. Rys., 238 S. W. 1066; Faulk v. K. C. Rys., 247 S. W. 253.
16. 239 S. W. 471 (Sp. CL Div. No. 1).
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
sued. Of course, all suits against the Director General are
suits against the United States. The Government of the
United States cannot be sued unless it consents. It has con-
sented to be sued in cases in which the carrier, being operated
by the Railroad Administration, could have been sued, had it
been operated by the owners. But the Government had not
consented to be sued for penalties. What then became of
cases arising under Sec. 4217, for injuries resulting in death
if the statute were penal? If the construction announced in
the Grier case, that the words "forfeit and pay," meant a
penalty, there could be no recovery from the Government for
this penalty. But now, in the McDaniel case, we have a third
interpretation. It is here held that the statute is not exclu-
sively penal, that damages may be awarded for compensation
or penalty whichever the jury may choose.
This condition is reflected in the trial courts for evidence
is casually admitted, almost in the face of well-established
rules, that would have been instantly excluded a few years
back.
One wonders if the tendency away from established rules
and precedents is a result of the World War. That upset all
kinds of business and other enterprises and has made the
paths of progress uncertain. Mayhap it had effect on judges,
lawyers and the law, too.
In any event it is certain and sure that our courts have
relaxed.
DouGLAs W. ROBERT.
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